(Enrico Colombatto, June 2012) 1 On the economics of institutions
As Adam Smith pointed out over two centuries ago, institutions matter: they affect individual action, influence cooperation and are crucial in making the difference between wealth and poverty, growth and stagnation. 1 Not surprisingly, therefore, speculation about the role and purpose of the rules of the game has generated myriad scholarly contributions. 2 In this vein, the neo-institutional literature has accorded to political authorities and philosophers the task of defining the goals to be pursued; and has put economists and lawyers in charge of designing the rules of the game required in order to attain the assigned targets. In particular, within the realm of economics, different schools of thought have developed a broad range of perspectives.
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For example, the mainstream approach has placed its trust in allegedly disinterested technocrats equipped with a variety of constrained-maximization tools. By contrast, constitutional economists have taken a more cautious view and have suggested solutions framed by rigorous straitjackets enforced by independent judges. Taking yet another approach, the public choice tradition has warned against the dangers of public intervention, characterized by the ubiquitous presence of government failures generated by policy-makers and social architects, victims to errors and vulnerable to rent-seeking temptations.
1 Adam Smith underscored the role of institutions both in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (e.g. in Part III) and in the Wealth of Nations (e.g. in Book V). See also Buchanan (1976) and Elsner (1989) on the Smithian insights into institutional analysis. 2 See for instance the surveys and references suggested in Hodgson (1989 Hodgson ( , 2004 and Sen (2009: Introduction) . See also Hodgson (2000) , who emphasizes the vantage point of the old-institutional scholars (from Veblen to Hamilton and Galbraith). 3 See Frey (2011) , who considers the new institutional economics as part of a broader literature on political economy and emphasizes its positive insights that range from Coase's contribution to the theory of the firm, to Williamson's emphasis on transaction costs and North's work on the rules of the game. the game originate from exogenous shocks or evolutionary impulses, possibly generated by inclusive-fitness mechanisms; and that their dynamics is led by ex-post determinism (path-dependence), 6 or by some evolutionary drive, in part Darwinian, in part Lamarckian. As effectively summarized in Greif and Leitin (2004) , the dynamics can indeed be explored through different lenses: game theory, historical institutionalism and also quasi-parametric analysis. Yet, essential questions remain on the table: Are GDP growth and informal institutions the best benchmarks with respect to which economists can evaluate the quality of the existing rules of the game? Why do we accept and sometimes advocate inefficient rules of the game, although we know they benefit only selected interest groups? Why do we often reject institutions that lead to good economic performances? In a word, what is the essence of institutional change? Should we content ourselves with residual explanations such as inertia or, rather, shouldn't we regard "inertia" as the outcome of more articulated mechanisms?
Against consequentialism: grand principles, ordinary institutions, ambitions, performance and legitimacy
The fundamental weakness of mainstream institutional economics originates from its failure to shed light on the concept of "good institutions": a failure that harkens back to the consequentialist view that the neoclassical tradition inherited from Henry Sidgwick, and according to which research agendas and policy-making efforts should aim at maximizing a more or less generic, arbitrarily defined social welfare function. A typical example is provided by the Posnerian approach to law and economics, characterized by the quest for material wealth. In contrast with this perspective, we believe that consequentialism requires a philosophically sound argument that explains this very choice. In other words, consequentialism reflects previous choices about which ends, and it is that choice among possible ends -rather than the ends/consequences per sewhich merits attention. 7 For example, institutions could be designed to maximize 6 See Acemoglou et al. (2005) , who develop an institutional context in which most relevant variables are endogenized except for technological accidents and poor coordination among the dominant groups; and Bénabou (2008) , who attempts to model inertia from a cognitive vantage point. 7 Most economists have preferred to ignore the methodological and philosophical critiques of consequentialism and the vast majority of students in economics are not even aware of the issues involved. See Anscombe (1958) , who coined the very term "consequentialism" and effectively analyzed its inconsistencies. consumption; but also to obtain income equality, increase military power, or guarantee free health-care and -why not? -well paid jobs for all the members of the community.
Thus, which is the appropriate goal? Not surprisingly, selecting the target often becomes a matter of political expediency to gather consensus. Yet, political expediency hardly qualifies as a "scientific" claim to social efficiency and clarifying the origin of institutional success by referring to consensus is not explanatory, but tautological at best.
This induces us to opt for a different approach. In particular, we make a distinction between the grand principles and the "ordinary institutions". Ordinary institutions consist of ordinary law making (legislation), as well as of the agencies and organizations that are created by means of ordinary law-making. They imply mandatory compliance 9 and are evaluated in relation to their conformity to the grand principles: in a word, ordinary institutions are undesirable ("bad") when they are ineffective or when they violate the grand principles, i.e. when they are in contrast with the individuals' ambitions, their expectations about performance and their sense of legitimacy.
Ambitions regard both what individuals want to obtain in their life and the institutional framework within which their efforts take place. Thus, ambitions pertain to the political (e.g. freedom of association and access to political careers), economic and social sphere (e.g. status and prestige). By contrast, performance mostly relates to the economic 8 See for instance Hayek (1960) and, within the institutionalist context, Ménard (1995) . 9 Thus, our definition excludes organizations issuing rules that individuals can reject or ignore without being sanctioned by an authority resorting to violence. For example, the judicial system, an antitrust authority and a mafia system that controls a portion of territory are ordinary institutions. A tennis club, a religious community or a gang of criminals are not ordinary institutions, unless they imply mandatory membership.
outcomes obtained through the enforcement of the existing rules and the creation of new ones. Typical examples of good performance are GDP growth and increasing living standards.
Legitimacy -the key component of our approach − is a matter of subjective value judgment and originates from the individual's assessment of the prevailing rules of the game in the light of his own criteria of fairness and justice. Although both fairness and justice apply to the intrinsic moral foundations of an action, we define fairness as relating to instinct (human nature), education and experience and implies consistency with the behaviour that one expects from the other members of his community. Put differently, fairness characterizes the individual's perception of the interaction among the various members of the community, which can meet the standards of honesty, charity and mutual trust (typical of a fair context) or come closer to the Hobbesian perspective on human nature (unfair behaviour). Lack of fairness is different than breaking ordinary laws and thus does not involve sanctions, but loss of reputation.
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On the other hand, in this article justice is defined in the negative: an action is unjust when it violates one's fundamental rights, unless such rights have been waived by its owner.
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Thus, the notion of justice ultimately depends on the perception of the social contract (social legitimacy), 12 on one's view about compliance with the rule of law (procedural legitimacy) and on one's moral standards (ideology, a synonym for one's grand principles). 13 10 Our distinction between ordinary laws and fairness is akin to the between rules and norms summarized in Crawford and Ostrom (1995) . Yet, it should be underscored that in our context, and contrary to the literature on norms, fairness does not relate to particular situations, but to the general context. Moreover, although fairness does contribute to the stability of society, in this article the notion of fairness includes value judgments and implies limited tolerance towards less than ideal ordinary rules inspired by grand principles one might not share entirely (see also section 2.2 below). 11 See Kant, as explained in VanDrunen (2002) ; and also Bastiat (1850 ) or -more recently -Berlin (1969 , Nozick (1974) and De Jasay (1998 /2002 for a negative definition of justice, as well as for an analysis of its implications. As it is widely acknowledged, the notion of negative justice was typical of the American constitution. See for example Sunstein (1990: 17) . Of course, the history of ideas has also put forwards other notions of justice, as recently documented in Sen (2009) . 12 It might be worth pointing out that this view differs from -say - Rawls (1958) , according to whom the social contract is defined by the notion of fairness, which in Rawls's view is equivalent to compliance with the agreed-upon criterion of justice. 13 The definitions of justice and fairness suggested here are by no means common practices in the literature, which often considers justice as a synonym for equality (Rawls 1958 and 1971) , or for fairness (Rawls 1958 and 1971; Hegtvedt and Johnson 2000) . In particular, our notion of justice does not follow Rawls (1958: 174) , according to whom it "regards the acceptance …. of a compromise between persons
Social and procedural legitimacies
Social legitimacy originates from one's perception of the social contract in place. To be fair, the very notion of social contract is both controversial and ambiguous. One cannot properly call a contract an agreement the content of which is not explicit and has not been signed by the parties involved. Nonetheless, although different individuals are likely to have different views about the content of this virtual contract, it is a fact that the members of a political community recognize the existence of widely shared principles. We posit that respect for these shared grand principles forms the essence of the implicit, recognizable social contract characterizing a community and that the legitimacy of political acts is judged according to their conformity or non-conformity with such principles. For example, some citizens might believe that immigration laws violate their own standards of justice (if their standard includes freedom of movement).
It might happen, however, that those very citizens are also likely to concede that most community members believe that residents should enjoy privileges over foreigners. In this light, legislation denying potential immigrants easy access to the local labour market would be deemed consistent with the existing social contract − and therefore socially legitimate.
as legitimate even when conformity with the grand principles appears questionable.
Under these circumstances, the greater the role of procedural legitimacy, the greater the importance of the electorate as judge of the policy-makers' legitimacy.
Justice, fairness and institutional stability
The previous section has underscored the broad shortcomings of the current economic approach to institutions which, in accordance with Dixit (2009), we characterize as essentially descriptive, badly equipped to shed light on the hodgepodge of interests promoted by policy-makers and organized coalitions; and thus unable to answer the critical objections raised by the school of public choice. By contrast, we believe that legitimacy should play the key role in a new theory of institutional dynamics and that, therefore, one should focus on the perception of legitimacy in order to unravel the puzzle of institutional change.
In this light, our next steps will consist in making use of the notions of justice and fairness in order to study how humans perceive the institutional context (this section) and develop insights into the dynamics of institutions and interaction (sections 3 and 4).
Section 5 concludes by suggesting a new appreciation of the social contract within an updated institutionalist context.
Absolute justice and civil liberty
As mentioned earlier, our point of departure draws on the social-psychology literature by holding that beliefs about justice and fairness play a significant role in the development of the individual's social preferences and in his assessment of the rules of the game. Certainly, grumbling might be pervasive when material consumption falls below expectations. Yet, unless the individual regards the institutional context as delegitimized, he seems more inclined to advocate improvements, rather than radical changes. In this vein, we posit that each person elaborates his own notion of justice For example, some people might think that they have no rights other than those produced and assigned by the state. At the other extreme, one can argue that each individual has a right to physical integrity, freedom of movement and unfettered private property.
16 From yet another vantage point, Thomas Aquinas and John Locke referred to the Bible in order to argue that all resources belong to God, that God put them at the disposal of humankind and that private property is a social arrangement introduced and enforced in order to diffuse tensions and encourage people to take care of the goods God gave them through society. In this perspective, therefore, private property does not belong to the realm of natural rights and a legitimate decision-maker is entitled to allocate common property to the individuals on the terms he thinks appropriate in order to promote the common good.
The second criterion refers to the notion of "civil liberty" (Blackstone, 1753 (Blackstone, /1893 1, chapter 1). When we enter a community -or assess our role within the society in which we happen to be born -we feel we have a right to a set of absolute liberties, but we also realize that if we stayed in isolation we would have only limited chances to flourish, i.e. to develop our nature and our potential.
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In other words, we are aware that our flourishing needs interaction; that our absolute liberties cannot be fully enjoyed unless they are properly protected (Locke, 1689a (Locke, /1764 (Locke, : 148 and 1689b (Locke, /2010 ; that cooperative agreements to that effect could be useful; and that cooperation might require compromising with our own ideological inclinations. That explains why most people are willing to join a community, follow its rules and give up some of their absolute rights. Civil liberty, therefore, is the bundle of rights left to the individual once he becomes part of a society. Put differently, according to our definition, civil liberties are not necessarily those that the state agrees to protect, but rather those that the state does not encroach upon and are hopefully strengthened as a consequence of government intervention. In particular, the smaller is the set of civil liberties, the greater the role of the state. And the more the state complies with the (classical-liberal) rule of law 18 and discourages rent-seeking practices, the greater one's propensity to accept the presence of the state, so as to enhance economic performance thanks to the rule of law, and flourishing thanks to the broader sets of interactions that such an institutional context would allow.
A graphical illustration of our argument is presented in graphs 1A and 1B below, in which we describe the behaviour of two hypothetical individuals, A and B, each of them enjoying or hoping to enjoy a given degree of liberty, as measured on the horizontal axis. In particular, points N identify one's ideal notions of liberty in a world in which social interaction plays no role; while points M correspond to the most desirable amount of liberty (or gov't intervention), given the fact that we want to cooperate in a social context and secure our rights from aggression. In particular, in graph 1A, individual A features a libertarian notion of absolute rights, which can be epitomized by the The classical-liberal notion of the rule of law requires that the rules be non-discriminatory (equality),that they do not undergo frequent revisions (stability), that they are not subject to arbitrary interpretation and that they be modified or interpreted according to simple and transparent mechanisms (procedural justice, which includes credibility). We shall here assume that the rule of law keeps rentseeking in check and is conducive to growth. Thus, compliance with the rule of law implies procedural legitimacy and negligible rent-seeking.
willing to bear the cost because the civil liberties he enjoys by joining the community create more opportunities for flourishing than the liberties he would enjoy in isolation.
To complete the picture, schedule A 2 describes a society in which rent-seeking is substantial (the rule of law is weak). In this situation, encroachment by the government generates abuse, economic performance trails off, flourishing is stifled and the sacrifices incurred in terms of absolute liberty do not yield significant rewards. In other words, perceived/expected flourishing under A 2 is less satisfactory than under A 1 , the benefits of government intrusion are rapidly exhausted and the demand for civil liberties is
Graph 1B is similar to Graph 1A, except for the fact that individual B might have a different perception of flourishing than A, has a socialist view of absolute liberty and believes that an ideal society should offer a more or less wide range of remedies to compensate for the presence of alleged market failures.
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Hence, he holds that government intervention does not hamper flourishing unless it is very substantial, and that "liberty" to the right of N B (with N B <N A ) would not be part of man's natural rights, 19 Our libertarian/socialist dichotomy echoes Humboldt (1852 Humboldt ( /1993 , who distinguished between the minimal state, which aims at securing individual freedom from coercion and possibly contract enforcement; and the modern state, which acts on behalf of the individual citizen and provides for his welfare. but mere chaos. From his perspective, therefore, absolute justice would not suffer too much in a society in which civil liberties are at M B (< M 1A ). Of course, an environment characterized by extensive rent-seeking would be problematic, since poor performance would throttle flourishing and therefore cause unease. This is why the B2 schedule lies below the B 1 curve. Yet, this context would not raise major problems in terms of legitimacy, but merely elicit reform, so as to make the current rules more effective. In other words, individuals belonging to the B group would simply attribute failure to imperfections, rather than to substantial institutional flaws. As a result, both schedules B 1 and B 2 would point at roughly the same level of M B , which defines the desirable rules of the game and is hardly affected by how those rules perform.
To summarize, we consider a social environment in which individuals pursue their flourishing and evaluate the institutional context by referring to their beliefs about justice (and fairness), and by assessing the extent to which the rules of the game favour flourishing. It is apparent that if a community includes only two stylized categories of individuals -A and B, as illustrated earlier on -civil liberties are going to be between M 1A and M B , if the rule of law is complied with (moderate rent-seeking); or between M 2A and M B , if rent-seeking is significant. In particular, one may expect that the gap between the civil liberties desired by A and B is limited when rent-seeking is moderate and performance is satisfactory. When performance deteriorates, however, the gap is likely to widen, since the A group presses for institutional change (more liberty), whereas the B group insists on institutional stability. 
Institutional gaps, fairness and transition costs
The second component of legitimacy is fairness, to which we now turn. Clearly, we all have our own flourishing schedules, which determine the desired intensity of government intrusion and -correspondingly − how much civil liberty we would like to enjoy. Thus, unless in exceptionally homogenous communities, the civil liberties that characterize a society are necessarily the result of a compromise, so that the liberty M i actually enjoyed by each member of the community differs from his ideal (previously 20 We shall expand on this point in sections 3 and 4. indicated as M 1A or M B in graphs 1). We shall henceforth identify such difference as the "institutional gap", which is likely to emerge whenever people fail to agree on the notion of liberty and the normative implications that follow; and either opting out (secession) entails significant costs, or the desired alternatives do not seem realistic. In this framework, therefore, fairness is what makes the institutional gap acceptable and reduces pressure for institutional change. In other words, a certain understanding of fairness is embedded in the assumptions that originate political life and for which the social contract is instituted: it draws both on the Hobbist view according to which the institutional gap is the cost the individual must bear in order to secure greater advantage; and on the Lockean claim that men are also driven by their feelings of a moral commitment towards other men, despite their differences (Gauthier 1977 ). Yet, it differs from Kuran's preference falsification (1995), according to which people follow the crowd for the sake of conformism and possibly cowardice. In particular, the graph shows the relationship between economic performance, flourishing and the required degree of fairness. For each level of performance, the lower the institutional gap D, the greater the proximity to one's ideal degree of liberty and the higher the perceived chances to flourish (see quadrant I, in which lower Fl schedules mean more flourishing). Likewise, when the economy does well and consumption increases, individuals believe that their chances to flourish expand, even if the institutional gap remains constant: this is how a movement to the right should be read, from lower to higher Fl levels. For example, let us call P a the level at which the 21 In Kuran's view individuals tend not to reveal their true preferences because they fear disapproval by the other members of the community. We prefer to differentiate between those who dissent, but respect other people's preferences and accept the implications of the implicit covenant in place; those who dissent, but play the game in order to reap rents (slick conformism); and those who conform with the majority just because it is the majority (passive conformism, somewhat akin to Kuran's version). individual expects the economy to operate and deliver. At that level, he believes that the ideal package of civil liberties (D=0) will provide him with a degree of flourishing Graph 2: how much fairness is needed? opportunities equal to Fl 3 . As noted earlier, however, in the real world the individual will hardly face a situation in which actual liberty corresponds to his desires. Yet, he will grin and bear − he will accept the institutional gap − if the rest of the community behaves fairly enough. Put differently, fairness is something that comforts the individual when he cannot get the flourishing he wants; and persuades him to abstain from cheating or free riding. For instance, if economic performance meets his expectations (P = P a ), satisfaction Fl 1 will content the agent as long as the institutional gap is no greater than D a and fairness is F a or higher. This is illustrated in quadrant II, in which the FF schedule describes the minimum amount of fairness required bridge an institutional gap:
points to the right of FF describe a lack of fairness, whereas points to the left of FF identify an excess.
We shall now make us of this analytical framework to explore to issues. First, we shall look at the tensions that arise when the libertarians and the socialists -taken separately − are unhappy about the incumbent institutional situation. In particular, we shall argue that the dynamics of institutional change is driven by the interaction between the institutional gap and fairness; and is magnified by inadequate performance. The institutional gap could lead to tensions that might be no longer reined in through fairness or highly satisfactory economic performance; tensions weaken legitimacy and the loss of legitimacy brings about institutional instability. Second, we shall complete the picture by putting forward some conjectures about what happens when the two groups interact, each of them with its own set of grievances, proposals and perceptions about the institutional transition costs. In particular, these costs include several components. For example, although individuals might argue in favour of institutional change, they cannot be certain that their desires will be fulfilled in the new institutional context. When it comes to ordinary law making, transition is never a movement from W to Z, but rather a path moving from W towards Z, but possibly ending in X or Y, which might not be preferable to W. Moreover, one should also consider that in a democracy the political mechanisms are not very reactive, especially when institutional change requires less government intervention: getting rid of regulation, bureaucrats and supervisory agencies takes time, even when the cost of politics is deeply resented by the majority of the population. As a result, it might well happen that a homogenous community undergoes ideological crisis, so that the current rules of the game no longer match the (new) grand principles; and yet transition costs, uncertainty and wily opposition by the incumbent policy-makers might prevent crisis from bringing about change.
The libertarian and the socialist path to tensions
Let us now see explore some implications related to the mechanisms we have been portraying in the previous section. In this vein, let us imagine that rent-seeking is moderate, that economic performance meets expectations (P = P a ), but that an institutional gap is present (D = D a ). As we have already shown in graph 2, the system remains free from tensions if F≥F a . However, when fairness is deficient (for instance, 
The libertarian reaction
Individuals of type A react to emerging tensions in various ways. For instance, they can engage in some kind of moralizing crusade, emphasize the significance of the social contract and promote a greater sense of civic responsibility, so as to reduce shirking and cheating. If successful, society then obtains F a and equilibrium is restored.
Alternatively, libertarians could respond by trying to bring about institutional change and thus obtain more civil liberties: if they succeed, D drops and, if P stays constant, flourishing reaches Fl 2 or higher.
In general, predicting the outcome remains elusive. But it is clear from our reasoning that tolerance with respect to the institutional gap depends on fairness and that its absence -even if partial − might generate cumulative phenomena. One behaves according to the rules of the game not only out of fear of incurring legal sanctions; but also if he deems that the institutional context has at least some legitimacy, that most of the other members of the community are fair and that by flouting the rules one risks ostracism (loss of reputation, isolation), not to mention the sense of guilt and shame. In other words, when people observe they are living in a community characterized by significant fairness (F>F**), they feel encouraged not to betray their trust (no cheating, no free riding, limited rent-seeking) and they also feel it is their duty to monitor and 22 To elaborate on an earlier point, in Kuran's (1995) perspective, fairness becomes deficient when individuals can no longer keep silent and eventually express their own beliefs and wishes. In our perspective, fairness become deficient when flourishing is in jeopardy and individuals put pressure for institutional change. Thus, "our" lack of fairness is not about the falsification of preferences (in fact "our" individuals are always rather clear about their preferences), but rather about explicit pressure for an institutional break. 23 Although this is obviously an oversimplified view of the world, it is adequate to illustrate the thrust of the argument put forward in this article. Further fruitful insights can surely be obtained by future research efforts, so as to include a more refined account of the ideological spectrum and yield a more articulated representation of government action and polycentrism (Ostrom and McGinnis 2011). expose in public unfair behaviour. As a result, fairness increases further (dF/dt >0) and becomes a self-reinforcing mechanism. By contrast, if unfair behaviour is widespread and the institutional context is discredited, the cost of flouting the rules drops.
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Once the tipping point F* is reached, the fall becomes cumulative: why should one be honest and run the risk of being tricked or deceived while everybody else is misbehaving? This situation is illustrated in the phase diagram below, where F stands for fairness and the interval F*-F** denotes a situation in which individuals do not feel like changing their attitude (the cumulative process does not operate).
dF/dt Graph 3
Two conclusions follow. First, since the lack of fairness might turn into a cumulative process, an unsustainable institutional gap is likely to generate increasing tensions, unless remedies are executed promptly enough. The slower the reaction, the greater the effort required to recover. On the other hand, beyond the tipping point F** in graph 3, fairness is deep enough to absorb ideological or performance shocks. Put differently, if society operates to the left of F* (e.g. F a <F*), it is intrinsically unstable and requires a drastic and hopefully timely therapy to reduce the institutional gap. By contrast, if a society operates to the right of F**, then its institutional legitimacy deepens: ethical 24 This point had already been noted in Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations (Book V.ii.f andk). More recently, Zak and Knack (2001: 317) show that "cheating is more likely (and trust is therefore lower) when the social distance between agents is larger, formal institutions are weaker, social sanctions against cheating are ineffective". If fairness was too close to the critical value F* prior to the shock (see graph 3 above), the new institutional gap might become large enough to undermine institutional legitimacy. When this happens, fairness is likely to fall further and, if fairness is held in low esteem and fails to be a unifying social element, rent-seeking pressures intensify, economic performance suffers and the institutional gap widens (movement from A 1 to A 2 in graph 1A, and thus from M 1A to M 2A ). Put differently, a libertarian ideological change might have destabilizing effects and lead to collapse, unless institutions evolve reasonably quickly. The intuition is that an ideological change in a balanced institutional situation in which fairness is close to F* reduces tolerance with regard to the incumbent situation. Flouting the rules of the 25 One might recall that the presence of rent-seeking marks the difference between the A 1 and A 2 schedules in graph 1A. 26 This implies that individuals are on the A 1 schedule in graph 1A and that society operates well to the left of FF in graph 2. 27 Although important, the analysis of the origin and nature of ideological shock would take us well beyond the purpose of this paper. See however Colombatto (2011: chapter 5) . 28 In our graphical representation an ideological shock is equivalent to a movement of the A 1 /A 2 schedules. When the shock is "positive", the schedules move to the right.
game becomes more frequent, fairness evaporates, the content and the very idea of the social contract fade away, the search for rents intensifies, performance falters and the institutional gap becomes even larger. As mentioned above, speed matters and institutional change might not be enough to redress and stabilize it again.
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The linchpin of the transmission mechanism remains the institutional gap even when instability is sparked by poor performance. True, if economic outcomes are only occasionally disappointing (cyclical crisis), the institutional gap is not going to be affected, insofar as agents consider they are still positioned on the A 1 schedule. Thus, they are unlikely to advocate institutional changes to neutralize rent-seeking or unfair behaviour. When crisis presents structural features, however, the institutional gap individuals A tolerate shrinks. If it is not absorbed by enough fairness, pressure for change occurs. Then, if the attempts to reduce rent-seeking are timely enough and successful, equilibrium is restored. Otherwise, demand for institutional change builds up and legitimacy is eventually lost.
The above situations are illustrated in graph 4, in which the origin identifies the initial equilibrium situation and the arrows show how a society characterized by free-market principles could lose legitimacy and, if fairness no longer succeeds in bridging the gap, spiral into an institutional crisis after having been hit by an ideological or a performance shock. The essence of the mechanism is straightforward: a change in the institutional gap puts a strain on fairness. If fairness is deficient, rent-seeking pressures emerge and reduce tolerance toward the existing institutional gap, which therefore widens.
In particular, this is how the various sections of the graph work. Quadrant I describes the minimum degree of fairness necessary in order to accommodate different institutional gaps and avoid a possible institutional crisis. In our example, in order to absorb an institutional gap D 1 , the community needs fairness equal to F 1 . The difference between current and actual fairness is illustrated in quadrant II, where the schedule has a 45° slope and measures how much fairness is missing, given that actual fairness is F 1 .
Of course, there will be one schedule for each degree of actual fairness. Thus, if D = D 1 , the desirable/required degree of fairness is F 1 and the difference between the actual fairness characterizing this society and required fairness is shown on the horizontal axis.
Since in our example actual fairness is also F 1 , the gap is zero. By contrast, if D increases to D 2 and fairness stays put (= F 1 ), then fairness is deficient and the horizontal axis shows the (positive) gap. Quadrant III describes the causal relation between missing fairness and rent-seeking: 30 as fairness is inadequate and institutions are 30 The temptation to engage in rent-seeking is of course always there. We all like privileges and guarantees. Nonetheless, it is plausible to assume that the incentive to seek privileges increases when cooperation looks less promising (fairness weakens), when the future is discounted at a higher rate (tensions emerge) and when politicians react to an increasing institutional gap by distributing privileges in order to obtain consensus -especially when economic performance is still relatively strong and the cost of rent-seeking more difficult to perceive. The dynamics is not very different if the shock comes from poor structural performance.
In this case, however, individuals believe they have moved from schedule A 1 to schedule A 2 : this movement causes a larger institutional gap and sparks the mechanism outlined earlier.
On socialist behaviour
In the previous paragraphs we have argued that liberal societies are stable when they rely on a significant stock of fairness, which cushions cyclical changes in economic conditions and relatively small alterations in the ideological climate. Can one make the same claim for the socialist members of a community? Do the shape and position of the flourishing functions typical of B lead to different conclusions than those we have reached for group A?
As pointed out in section 2.1, for our purposes liberals and socialists diverge in two respects. First, their notion of absolute liberty differs (N B <N A ), so that the size andmost importantly -the sign of their institutional gap is not the same: whereas for the libertarians the institutional environment might be delegitimized by excessive government intervention and insufficient liberties, the opposite holds true for the socialists, who believe that justice is enhanced by government intervention and by curtailing some individuals' liberties in the name of equality. Furthermore, when rentseeking dents performance, the liberals react by advocating de-regulation and more liberties in order to reduce the greater institutional gap. By contrast, the socialists react by advocating improved policy-making, a more effective bureaucracy, more rigorous monitoring. In other words, according to the socialist vision, rent-seeking does not delegitimize the institutional framework. From this vantage point, therefore, tensions emerge because of disappointment with performance, not because the institutions are "bad" or perceived differently than before.
From the socialist perspective, therefore, the results presented with reference to the liberal case can be reformulated in the following terms. In a homogenous society composed of socialist individuals, institutional stability can only be threatened by ideological change, as a result of which the agents come closer to the libertarian view or advocate a greater role for government intervention, depending on the sign of the change. For example, individuals modify their views on equality, so that more or less redistribution is advocated. Or they modify their view on individual responsibility, so that more or less government regulation is promoted. The consequences of an ideological change in the socialist camp are similar to those outlined for the libertarians.
In particular, in the case of a move towards greater income equality and stricter regulation, people's willingness to forego more liberty creates an institutional gap:
agents feel that the existing institutions offer too many opportunities to betray the underlying social contract and that social fairness might not be deep enough to keep those temptations in check. Certainly, as the need for fairness intensifies, individuals tend to care less about the common good and are likely to focus on their own self interest. Therefore, the search for rents and guarantees grows, even it implies deterioration in aggregate economic performance. Contrary to the libertarian case, however, the institutional gap does not widen further. In other words, an increase in rent-seeking and a decline in performance do not affect the rules of the game, which prove resilient (stable). People might be unhappy about the state of the economy and believe that their flourishing is choked. Yet, unless ideological change occurs, pressure for institutional change is going to be weak.
Of course, one may wonder whether socialist behaviour still qualifies as socialist after an ideological shock. The answer is twofold, and draws upon a relative and an absolute criterion. Consistent with our discussion in section 2 and graphs 1A and 1B, individuals are socialist as long as (1) their ideal and their desirable amounts of liberty -N B and M B , respectively − are lower than the libertarians'; and (2) poor economic performance does not weaken the legitimacy of extensive government intervention and therefore generates demand for "better" intervention, rather than "less" intervention.
Interaction and change
The upshot of the previous two sections is straightforward. Tensions might surface from time to time, but they tend to play a minor role, since most members of the community sincerely believe that they are living in the best possible world (or almost). In partial accordance with the neo-institutional literature, therefore, one could indeed argue that a society that is initially stable is bound to remain stable unless hit by a shock that delegitimizes the institutional context because the grand principles have changed.
Hence, this society does follow a path-dependent process (inertia), in that institutional activity consists in accommodating to the last shock and developing suitable conventions, until something new occurs.
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Certainly, the legislators might introduce adjustments in the realm of ordinary law making, sometimes in response to technological innovation or cyclical fluctuation, other times as a result of the political quest for consensus. Yet, the grand principles and the notion of liberty are not going to be affected significantly. In the end, protracted institutional stability is likely to strengthen the underlying element of fairness and thus make the social structure more resilient to shocks.
Absent serious ideological crises, in our perspective the critical element leading to the emergence of possibly serious institutional unrest is the presence of a large enough group of libertarians, who are more sensitive to the link between performance and institutional legitimacy and therefore more inclined to ask for institutional change. The implication is that when the libertarian component is weak, society is stable. Its performance might be disappointing, but it requires disaster before the institutional context is questioned.
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Our analysis also suggests a few additional conclusions: First, minorities -in the ideological sense -do not pose major social problems for communities characterized by a clearly identifiable social contract with which the population complies spontaneously (fairness, according to our terminology). Put differently, as long as the social contract is clear, rent-seeking is contained and everybody plays according to the rules of the game, libertarian groups do not feel overly oppressed in socialist environments and vice-versa.
it examines both the impact of the role of government on trust (fairness) and to what extent trust leads to greater government intervention. See for instance Bergh and Bjørnskov (2011) . 33 This process is known in the literature as the "punctuated equilibrium effect" (Young, 1996) . 34 This possibility had already been conceived by Tocqueville (1835 Tocqueville ( -1840 Tocqueville ( /2010 Tocqueville ( : 1261 . See also Berggren et al. (2011) on the relation between stability and growth.
Second, rent-seeking is certainly likely to provoke resentment in both libertarian and socialist communities; but it brings about institutional crisis only when the libertarian component is substantial and fairness dwindles. Under such circumstances, the libertarians would advocate structural change, whereas the socialists would press for better regulation and monitoring in order to revive growth and keep rent-seeking in check.
Third, finding an institutional solution to unrest becomes critical when the institutional gap is no longer tolerable and perceived fairness does not allow much flexibility. This becomes even more problematic when society is fragmented in many groups and loyalty to the group is more important than fair behaviour with regard to the overall community. Then, the fragility of the social contract becomes apparent and respect for its clauses is necessarily flimsy. Flouting the rules is eventually tolerated and giving in to rent-seeking is often regarded as an attractive solution to social stalemate. Put differently, interaction appears challenging; and it becomes acute when fairness is limited and there is no obvious way out other than giving in to organized coalitions, the action of which will depress economic performance and widen the institutional gap suffered by the libertarians. At that point, two outcomes can emerge. Some groups may fall victim to deep-pocket policy-making to the benefit of those who try to exploit the system to acquire privileges (slick conformists); or rent-seeking becomes so burdensome that the socialist group eventually gives in and accepts free-market reforms to revive economic performance.
All in all, we admit that the dynamics of ideological change -and thus legitimacy − remains hard to define. As we have argued elsewhere, however, we believe that shared beliefs are almost exogenous. In particular, ideological change is a very rare event and requires momentous shocks that radically affect the way people perceive the role of the individual in a social context. Typical examples were the Gregorian Revolution in the late eleventh century and the Thirty Year War in the seventeenth century: the first sparked the debate on the source and legitimacy of the political authority, whereas the latter undermined the foundations of the divine order on earth (secularization).
35
Although generalizations are often deceptive, we deem that at present Western societies are under the influence of the ideological change sparked by the Great War, as a result of which the notion of absolute liberty has come relatively close to the socialist ideal.
As witnessed by the increase in government expenditure and regulation that has characterized the past decades, it appears that the vast majority of the population in much of the Western world is fairly happy with a limited version of absolute liberty. In a word, most of us are close to the socialist end of the spectrum and not inclined to question the legitimacy of the current grand principles of the game, no matter how disappointing economic performance might be. As result, we believe that today's modern societies feature a rather limited institutional gap and that institutional legitimacy is not a major issue. Government intervention turns into a matter of fine tuning, but its size and nature are not really doubted. In this light, investigating the drivers of institutional change in a society composed by principled members of society is not going to be fruitful. Instead, social scientists should concentrate on the drivers and consequences of soft discontent, slick conformism and uncritical, passive conformism.
It is of course true that shocks can disrupt the institutional context and generate tensions. In this light, therefore, the challenge faced by the social scientist is to assess what kind of shocks can break inertia and how to articulate the mechanics of change, which is by no means warranted.
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The institutionalist literature remains rather vague on both points. We have tried to make some progress by suggesting that there exists a tipping point beyond which the shock could lead to institutional crisis, that the position of this tipping point is defined by the width of the tolerable institutional gap, and that this gap is defined by legitimacy: fairness and justice. Put differently, unhappiness might easily bring about tensions and discontent and the implicit social bonds that constitute the essence of fairness might be shaken. Yet, discontent about one's own situation does not necessarily imply that one elaborates or imagines a new institutional 35 It might be observed that the term "shock" is in fact rather misleading, since it conveys the idea that change takes place rather rapidly, in a few days or weeks. In fact, ideological shocks may take decade or even centuries to unfold. For instance, the full consequences of secularization became visible only in the nineteenth century. 36 To repeat our earlier point, tensions do not necessarily provoke institutional change, although they might create opportunities for populism and rent-seeking.
architecture inspired by a consistent vision of liberty and individual responsibility. In fact, a second tipping point must be reached, so that the institutional transition costs (broadly understood) are overcome. In the end, unless the institutional gap reaches a critical point, and unless uncertainties and inertias are overcome, the outcome is conformism, grumbling and rent-seeking, while ordinary institutions adjust at the margin, with no substantial change.
What do we make of institutional economics?
This article is inspired by the belief that individuals' attitudes and their willingness to interact, exchange and cooperate are not entirely the outcome of a common evolutionary story. Our very nature of human beings presumes our ability to choose whether to give in to our instincts and emotional drives, or rather engage in rational sets of actions, possibly restrained by value judgments (morals). As a matter of fact, policy-makers can react to tensions and crises by following different patterns. They can operate at the margin by adjusting ordinary law-making within the institutional environment defined by the current grand principles; they can try to strengthen fairness in order to diffuse pressures; or they could acknowledge the existence of a new context of grand principles and engage in deep change. Be that as it may, the present article has argued that in most cases populism, expediency and marginal adjustments will prevail, no matter the character of the regime -libertarian or socialist. One may change the tax structure or the redistribution of rents, but the grand principles are very rarely questioned. Individuals might feel frustrated in their endeavours to flourish, they might be aware that the current rules of the game are responsible for the lack of opportunities and disappointing economic conditions. Yet, lack of convergence on a new, widely shared ideological structure prevents new grand principles from emerging. This is particularly true when the cost of transition remains uncertain, and is magnified in societies with a socialist tradition, in which the sense of individual responsibility is modest and can be further aggravated when the population quickly aging. To repeat, unease and tensions do not necessarily lead to crises. When fairness is deeply rooted, institutions can still be legitimate despite the presence of injustice. On the other hand, when discontent is significant, the extent to which it degenerates and society becomes vulnerable to rent-seeking pressures marks the difference between relatively successful societies (in which rent-seeking is limited or highly inclusive)
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, and communities featuring large pockets of wasteful privileges, in which cooperation is biased towards personal relationships and the opportunities offered by impersonal exchange governed by procedural effectiveness and legitimacy are overlooked.
A proper investigation of these situations lies beyond the purpose of these pages and certainly deserves much more than just a few lines. Nonetheless, it is apparent that the economic analysis of the mechanisms through which fairness operates also requires historical, anthropological and sociological insights. For example, when vast layers of the population take the socialist grand principles for granted and accept the role of the 38 In accordance with Olson (1965) , inclusive rent-seeking refers to large coalitions, whose activities are likely to produce only limited externalities.
state as an income equalizer, an insurer and a suitable producer of selected merit goods, then the notion of fairness helps to draw the line between tolerable and intolerable individual behaviour in the presence of hardship. Under such circumstances, therefore, even when the prevailing degree of civil liberties is relatively modest, the presence of widespread fairness ensures that Adam Smith's impartial spectator acts effectively. Put differently, although government intervention reduces the economic impact of individual decision-making, individuals perform responsibly, since they are driven by a mutually-enforcing sense of moral obligation. By contrast, when fairness is feeble, socialist grand principles become an alibi for running away from individual responsibilities in the presence of economic crisis. And when intensified rent-seeking is impractical because of budgetary stringency or sheer decency, the hunt for deep pockets begins.
At the same time, our view has emphasized that the debate on the role of fairness should always be framed in the light of the existing institutional gap and, therefore, of moral standards. True, today's prevailing emphasis on the pragmatic role of institutions 39 seems to strengthen an authoritative tradition according to which legitimacy is indeed a mere question of fairness. Advocates of the so-called "Veneer Theory", for example, hold that morality is just a hypocritical layer covering up men's purely rational, selfinterested core (Wright, 1994) . We do acknowledge that for most people morality might be a puzzling notion and that for a substantial number of individuals fundamental principles boil down to the (absolute) right to physical integrity and a generic right to solidarity, the rest being subject to debate and negotiation. But we also agree with De Waal (2006) , who maintains that individuals do have a more or less sophisticated sense of morality. It originates from an evolutionary process that combines passions, emotions and instincts on one hand; and it gives substance to the Smithian "impartial spectator", who allows us to make value judgments about potential goals and behaviours, and to 39 Neglect of the transcendental vantage point is consistent with mainstream (neoclassical) economics, as well as with the position held by influential thinkers. For example, in the early 1940s Frank Knight advocated the discovery of morality through discussion (van Horn and Emmett 2011). In a similar vein, although from different quarters, Amartya Sen held that justice is synonymous with fairness and should be defined by rationally debating its content, starting from a broad enough definition and keeping only those elements that do not solicit substantial objections. It might be worth pointing out that common to these lines of thought is that morality is ultimately to be defined by intellectuals.
transform subjective judgments into general rules also applicable outside the community to which we belong.
In this vein, the traditional, neo-institutional view on how to analyze evolution might need to be reassessed. True, the dynamics of ordinary institutions is powered by the interaction between concerns for efficiency and pressures from different interest groups;
and is also influenced by significant institutional costs (inertia). Still, the kind of game and the playing ground that determine the range of actions and reactions are to be defined at a higher level. Neglect for this component runs the risk of transforming institutional analyses either into empirical exercises in ex post determinism, or into generic models according to which everything depends on everything. In either case, the reader would look in vain for persuasive explanations.
